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IDENTITY OF PARTIES 
Appellant: Larry Ray Reeves 
Resondents: Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., a New York 
Corporation; 
Eli Lilly & Co., an Indiana corporation; 
Gerald R. Moress, M.D. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the lower court err in denying appellant Larry Ray 
Reeves the opportunity to conduct further discovery pursuant to Motion 
and an Affidavit submitted under Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P., prior to 
granting respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment, thereby violating 
legal principles of summary judgment and depriving appellant Reeves 
of his constitutional right to legal redress of his injuries? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Larry Ray Reeves seeks review of a ruling from the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick presiding, granting respondents' Motions 
for Summary Judgment- as to all claims asserted by appellant in a 
complex products strict liability and medical malpractice action. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a complex products strict liability and medical 
malpractice action wherein appellant Larry Ray Reeves seeks damages 
from respondents CIBA-Geigy Inc., manufacturer of the drug Tegretol, 
Eli Lilly & Co., manufacturer of the drug Phenobarbital, and 
Dr. Gerald E. Moress, a physician who prescribed and administered 
these drugs to appellant as treatment for a seizure disorder, for 
injuries appellant Reeves suffered from these drugs, including third-
degree, full-thickness chemical burns over 66.6% of his skin; 
damage to organs, tissue and muscles; severe, extensive and 
permanent scarring and disfigurement; extreme physical and mental 
pain and anguish; loss of earnings and earning capacity; repeated 
hospitalizations and medical expenses to date of approximately 
$220,000.00. 
Specifically, appellant Reeves claims that respondents Geigy 
and Lilly are strictly liable and/or negligent in their design, 
testing, manufacturing, marketing, distribution, labeling and 
promotion of the drugs Tegretol and Phenobarbital, particularly 
in failing to provide adequate warnings of the adverse side 
effects suffered by appellant Reeves, thereby causing him to 
suffer the injuries described above. 
Appellant Reeves also claims that respondent Dr. Moress is 
strictly liable and/or negligent in prescribing, marketing, 
distributing and promoting the use of Tegretol and/or Phenobar-
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bital to him for treatment of his seizure disorder, failing to 
warn appellant Reeves of the possible adverse side effects from 
the use of Tegretol and/or Phenobarbital, including the side 
effects suffered by appellant Reeves, failing to obtain 
appellant's informed consent to the administration of these 
drugs, and in failing to adequately monitor his use of these 
drugs, thereby causing the alleged injuries to appellant 
Reeves. 
On February 8, 1984, appellant Reeves filed his Complaint 
and demand for jury trial. (R. 2-23) Respondent Lilly filed 
a motion to dismiss based upon lack of jurisdiction (R. 40-49), 
appellant responded (R. 49-53), and Respondent Lilly finally 
stipulated to jurisdiction.(R. 70-72) 
Respondent Dr. Moress answered on March 2, 1984, (R. 32-39) 
and respondent Geigy filed its Answer on April 13, 1984. (R. 84-96) 
In their Answers, respondents denied liability to appellant 
under the strict products liability and negligence theories 
asserted by appellant, and alleged numerous affirmative defenses 
to appellant's claims. (R. 32-39; 84-96) 
On April 9, 1984, appellant Reeves commenced discovery, by 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, 
regarding all facets of the manufacturing, testing, inspection, 
marketing, distribution, labeling and promotion of the drugs Tegretol 
and Phenobarbital, which caused appellant's injuries (R. 78-83), 
and defendant Dr. Moress's conduct in relation to the prescription, 
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marketing/ distribution, promotion, administration and monitoring 
of Tegretol and/or Pheobarbital to appellant Reeves. (R. 75-77) 
The foregoing discovery resulted in the production of 
several thousand pages of documents; the filing of numerous objec-
tions to interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents which appellant's counsel/ together with respondents' 
counsel/ spent considerable time and effort trying to resolve. 
During the Spring and Summer of 1984/ appellant also 
responded to respondents' interrogatories (R. 98-99; 116-117; 
129-131) and the parties conducted numerous depositions. (R. 100-103; 
113-114; 127-128) 
Although appellant Reeves served his First Set of 
Interrogatories to respondent Lilly on April 9, 1984/ (R. 81-83)/ 
respondent Lilly did not file its answers and objections until 
August 27, 1984. (R. 132-133) 
In December/ 1984, the parties conducted a second round of 
depositions, including the deposition of appellant Reeves and certain 
physicians at the University Medical Center/ who were involved in the 
treatment of appellant Reeves' injuries. (R. 136-137) 
In January/ 1985, the mother of appellant Reeves was deposed 
(R. 140-144) and appellant Reeves served a second round of 
requests for production of documents seeking information 
regarding the knowledge of respondents Geigy and Lilly of adverse 
reactions to Tegretol and Phenobarbital. (R. 145-154) 
On April 5/ 1985, respondent Geigy produced approximately 
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2,000 documents in response to appellant's request and objected 
to producing numerous documents requested by appellant. 
In May, 1985, appellant Reeves also requested information 
concerning adverse drug reactions to Tegretol and Phenobarbital 
from the United States Food and Drug Administration and in July 
and August, 1985, received several thousand computer printout pages 
of data concerning adverse drug reactions to the drugs Tegretol 
and Phenobarbital. 
On February 25, 1986, Judge Frederick, pursuant to his 
usual practice of reviewing the status of cases pending more 
than one year, conducted a conference with counsel for the 
parties concerning the status of the case. (R. 157) At that time, 
appellant's counsel indicated to the Court that appellant was 
still involved in the completion of discovery and could not 
certify readiness for trial before sixty days or longer, due 
to previous commitments on other matters scheduled for trial 
and hearing, and the need to complete discovery in the action. 
Based upon the parties' stipulation, the Court continued 
the matter for further status report in 60 days. (R. 157) 
Appellant was still in the process of digesting and cross-
checking the information concerning adverse drug reactions 
received from respondents and the F.D.A. when, on April 28, 
1986, respondent Dr. Moress filed his motion for summary judgment 
(R. 175-177), based upon two grounds: (1) that Dr. Moress 
allegedly complied with existing standards of care in treating 
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appellant Reeves; and (2) that Tegretol and Pheobarbital, the 
two drugs prescribed by respondent Moress for appellant Reeves, 
were allegedly not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered 
by appellant Reeves. 
In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, respondent 
Dr. Moress submitted affidavits of two local physicians, Joel 
M. Thompson, M.D., and Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D., (R. 158-165), 
generally stating that, in their respective opinions, respon-
dent Moress's treatment of appellant Reeves was appropriate. 
Dr. Swinyer also stated that he did not believe that the drugs 
Tegretol and/or Phenobarbital administered to appellant Reeves 
by respondent Dr. Moress were the cause of appellant Reeves's 
injuries. 
Respondent Dr. Moress also filed a memorandum in support 
of his Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 166-174) which included 
characterizations of fact and conclusions of fact purportedly 
supported by references to depositions of appellant Reeves's 
mother, Alma Cook, and appellant Reeves's treating physician, 
Dr. Glen Warden. (R. 167-169) 
On April 30, 1986, respondents Geigy and Lilly filed their 
joint Motion for Summary Judgment, relying solely on the grounds 
previously asserted by respondent Moress and upon the memorandum 
and affidavits submitted by respondent Dr. Moress in support of 
his Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 180-185) 
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Prior to receiving respondents' Motions for Summary 
Judgment, appellant Reeves had sought expert medical opinions 
concerning appellant's claims against respondent Dr. Moress for 
medical malpractice and appellant's claim that his injuries were 
caused by Tegretol and/or Phenobarbital, the drugs manufactured by 
respondents Geigy and Lilly and prescribed to appellant Larry Reeves 
by respondent Dr. Moress. The expert physicians consulted 
by appellant's counsel expressed the need for further information 
before they could render the opinions to oppose those stated by 
respondents' physicians in their affidavits supporting respondents' 
Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Thus, on May 6, 1986, appellant's counsel filed a Motion To 
Extend Discovery and For Continuance of Hearing on Defendants' Motion 
For Summary Judgment, requesting additional time for discovery 
to oppose respondents' summary judgment motions. (R.186-187) 
Appellant's counsel also filed an Affidavit In Opposition 
To Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P., 
averring that appellant was unable to submit affidavits in opposition 
to the affidavits Submitted in support of respondents' motions without 
further discovery which appellant requested the opportunity to 
conduct. Appellant's counsel further indicated that certain delays 
in completing discovery had occurred because of previously 
scheduled court matters and were in no way attributable to 
any lack of diligence on the part of appellant Reeves. (R. 188-190) 
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Respondents filed no objection to appellant's motion for 
additional discovery and filed no objection or motion to strike 
the Affidavit of appellant's undersigned counsel under Rule 56(f) 
prior to the hearing on respondents' motions for summary judgment 
and appellant's motion to continue discovery on June 2, 1986. 
At that time, following oral argument on the motions, Judge 
Frederick granted respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment, 
denied appellant's Motion To Extend Discovery and dismissed 
this action "with prejudice", despite the affidavit of appellant's 
counsel filed in good faith pursuant to Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P., 
appellant's reasonable request for additional discovery to 
properly oppose the motions, and appellant's argument that 
the evidence offered by respondents in support of their Motions 
for Summary Judgment did not entitle respondents to be granted 
summary judgment against appellant Larry Reeves. 
The Court did not make render any written findings, conclusions 
of law, or opinion regarding the basis for its decision to grant 
respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment and no record was made 
of the oral argument on the Motions or the Court's expressed reasons 
for granting the Motions. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred in denying appellant Reeves the opportunity 
to conduct further discovery pursuant to Motion and an Affidavit filed 
under Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P., prior to granting respondents' Motions 
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For Summary Judgment, where respondents never objected to, or moved 
strike, appellant's Motion or Affidavit prior to the hearing on 
the Motions, and appellant's requests for further discovery to oppo 
the Motions for Summary Judgment were made in good faith and were 
reasonable in light of the nature and circumstances of the action, 
thereby violating legal principles of summary judgment, and 
depriving appellant Reeves of his constitutional right to redress 
of injuries. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT FURTHER DISCOVERY 
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(f), PRIOR TO THE ENTRY 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THEREBY VIOLATING LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DEPRIVING 
APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LEGAL 
REDRESS OF INJURIES 
In Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-313 (Utah 1984), 
relying on its prior decision in Strand v.Associated 
Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (1977), 
this Court reaffirmed the duty of lower courts to permit a party 
to conduct additional discovery pursuant to the filing of an 
affidavit under Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P., prior to granting a motion 
for summary judgment 
Where, however, the party opposing summary 
judgment timely presents his affidavit under 
Rule 56(f) stating reasons why he is presently 
unable to proffer evidentiary affidavits, he 
directly and forthrightly invokes the trial 
court's discretion. Unless dilatory or lacking 
in merit, the motion should be liberally 
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treated. Exercising sound discretion the 
trial court determines whether the stated 
reasons are adequate. 
Emphasis supplied. 
This Court has also indicated that when an affidavit is 
filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and the 
movant does not object to, or move to strike, the affidavit 
before it is admitted, the movant waives the right to complain 
that the affidavit is not sufficient and waives his opposition 
to whatever evidentiary defects may exist. Strange v. Qstlund, 
594 P.2d 877 (Utah 1979); Franklin Financial v. New Empire 
Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, as in all cases premised on theories of 
products strict liability and negligence, the threshold issue is 
whether the product in question caused the plaintiff's injury. If 
the product in question has been the subject of litigation for 
sometime, the fact that the product in question caused the 
injury suffered may be well established, and extensive 
discovery may be unnecessary. However, this is not always 
true . 
As this Court observed in Berry By And Through Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah 1975), long 
delayed health hazards from prescription drugs and chemicals 
can cause disease and death many years after exposure. Litiga-
tion concerning the injuries inflicted from such diverse products 
as asbestos, the Dalkon Shield birth control device, and the 
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drug DES, graphically demonstrate that a decade of litigation 
may be required to discover the evidence necessary to establish, by 
competent evidence, the causative link between a product and 
a specific injury. 
Why? Generally speaking, because the information showing that 
a particular product causes a particular injury is known only to the 
manufacturer of the product, and the manufacturer does not want 
to reduce its profits by publicizing the fact that its product causes 
certain injuries, or face the possibility that a government agency 
may require the product to be recalled and modified, or be withdrawn 
from the market. 
In order to avoid disclosure of information that its 
product causes particular injuries, manufacturers may simply 
ignore reports of injuries, fail to report injuries to public 
agencies despite their legal duty to do so, fail to conduct 
proper tests and studies to verify whether certain injuries 
alleged to be caused by a particular product are, in fact, 
caused by the product, or simply conceal the facts from the 
public. 
In the event that manufacturers do not publically disclose 
injuries from their products, persons who are injured by them 
are put in the position of having to bear the expense and trouble 
of obtaining the raw data which shows that the manufacturers are 
aware that certain injuries are being caused by their product, by 
virtue of reports from people using the product or the physicians 
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who are treating them. 
After obtaining the data, the injured person must then find 
medical experts who can interpret the data, perform tests and 
form opinions as to whether a particular product causes a particular 
injury. This process, when undertaken in the context of litigation, is 
time consuming, expensive, and often requires several years to accompl 
In this case, the record indicates that appellant Reeves had 
conducted vigorous discovery, that additional discovery was reasonably 
required and being pursued by appellant at the time respondents 
filed their Motions for Summary Judgment, that appellant made a timely 
Motion To Extend Discovery and filed a timely and appropriate Affidavi 
pursuant to Rule 56(f), verifying appellant's need to conduct further 
discovery to properly oppose respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment 
The record in this case also reveals that respondents never 
objected to appellant's motion to extend discovery and that 
respondents never objected to, or moved to strike, the Affidavit of 
appellant's counsel indicating the need for further discovery 
prior to the hearing on respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Based upon the foregoing, appellant Reeves submits that 
the lower court's action in denying him the right to conduct 
further discovery to oppose respondent's Motions for Summary 
Judgment violated appellant's rights pursuant to Rule 56(f). 
In addition, appellant Reeves contends that the lower 
court's action in denying appellant further discovery to 
oppose respondents' motions for summary judgment, deprived 
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appellant Reeves of his constitutional right to legal redress 
against respondents for his injuries. 
Article I, Sections 7, of the Utah Constitution guarantees 
that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law." Article I, Section 11, 
declares that an individual shall have a right to a "remedy by due 
course of law" for injury to one's "person, property, or reputation." 
In Berry By And Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), this Court relied upon this consitutional 
provision in declaring Section 3 of the Utah Products Liability Act, 
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-15-1, et. seq. (1953), unconstitutional 
insofar as it barred claims for injuries from products which were 
asserted "more than six years after the date of initial purchase 
for use or consumption, or ten years after the date of 
manufacture of a product." In so holding, this Court exhaustively 
reviewed the historical antecedents of Article I, Section 11, noting 
the "fundamental obligation of government to provide reasonable 
remedies for wrongs done persons." 717 P.2d at 675-681. 
In the instant case, the lower court, in denying appellant 
Reeves the opportunity to conduct reasonable discovery to oppose 
respondents' motions for summary judgment prior to granting the 
motions, deprived appellant Reeves of his right to legal 
redress against respondents for his injuries as arbitrarily 
as the products liability statute of repose struck down by this 
Court in Berry. 
Summary judgment must be supported by evidence, admissions 
and inferences which, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
losing side, establish that "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law." Geneva Pipe Co* v. 
S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986) This principle 
of summary judgment assumes, and fundamental notions of fairness 
as embodied in Article I, Sections 7 and 11, of the Utah Constitution 
demand that the party opposing summary judgment be afforded 
a fair and adequate opportunity, under the facts and circumstances 
of the particular case, to conduct the discovery necessary to 
adduce facts in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, 
before his constitutional right to legal redress can be forever 
foreclosed, as occurred in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court committed reversible error and deprived 
appellant Reeves of his fundamental, constitutional legal 
right to redress of injuries, when it granted respondents' Motions 
for Summary Judgment without affording appellant Reeves a reasonable 
opportunity to conduct discovery pursuant to a timely Motion to 
Extend Discovery and an Affidavit filed, in good faith, pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P., in order to properly 
oppose the motions. 
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In consequence of the points and authorities set forth 
herein, appellant Larry Ray Reeves respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the summary judgments entered by the 
lower court/ and remand this case with instructions to the lower 
court to permit appellant Reeves a reasonable time for discovery 
to oppose respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
DATED AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/ day of February, 
1987. 
COLLA 
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